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The Administration of President Donald J. Trump has promised to
impose trade sanctions in the form of higher tariffs on imports from
nations that engage in unfair trade practices against the United States.
Trump argues that increased tariffs will help the states that have
suffered losses from international trade and was able to propel himself
to victory in the 2016 presidential election based at least in part on
these claims. However, tariffs are a blunt instrument and ill-suited to
achieve domestic policy goals. Imposing higher tariffs on imports can
actually harm the states because (1) U.S. trading partners might impose
retaliatory tariffs on U.S. imports; (2) states may rely on imports as raw
materials for use in manufacturing exports; and (3) jobs lost to
overseas locations will not return to the United States and more job
losses may result. As the states cannot evade the harmful effects of
federal trade sanctions on their own, there is the need for a federal-state
consultative mechanism through which the states can provide input to
the federal government. With input from the states, the federal
government can adjust federal policies to mitigate the unpredictable 
harms that the states may suffer as a result of those policies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Administration of President Donald J. Trump has announced that it will
pursue international trade policies that “[p]ut[] America [f]irst.”1 To pursue this
                                                                                                                     
* Frank E. and Virginia H. Bazler Chair in Business Law, The Ohio State University 
Michael E. Moritz College of Law.
1 President Donald J. Trump’s Foreign Policy Puts America First, WHITEHOUSE.GOV
(Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-
trumps-foreign-policy-puts-america-first/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/HHD
7-L755].
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goal, President Trump has announced that he may withdraw the United States
from trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, that
are unfavorable to U.S. interests.2 He has also stated that he intends to impose
trade sanctions, such as higher tariffs, on countries such as China and Mexico
that engage in unfair trade practices with the United States.3 The additional
tariffs could decrease the massive influx of imports from these countries4 and
may cause jobs that have been moved overseas to return to the United States.5
Eliminating unfair trade practices will also lead to the creation of new jobs.6
Those states that have lost jobs and suffered as a result of unfair international
trade practices will see direct economic benefits from the President’s trade 
policies.7 Trump’s trade policies appealed to a wide segment of the population
that felt unfairly harmed by international trade and helped to propel him to
victory in the 2016 presidential election.8
While Trump’s policies may have an appeal at first glance, there are some
serious flaws with using trade sanctions to achieve domestic policy goals, such
as creating new jobs. Tariffs and other trade sanctions have historically proven
to be dull and imprecise instruments that cannot be finely calibrated to achieve
domestic policy goals.9 While Trump may have won the 2016 election based at
least in part on his aggressive trade policies,10 his policies based on the use of
                                                                                                                     
2 See Matt Ford, How Easily Could Trump Withdraw the U.S. from NAFTA?, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/trump-
nafta-withdrawal-order/524463/ [https://perma.cc/X24B-8AVL].
3 See Jason Margolis, Trump’s Trade Policies Worry Economists, USA TODAY (July 
25, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/07/25/donald-trump-trade-
policies-china-mexico/87521852/ [https://perma.cc/5C67-3P5Q].
4 In 2016, the United States had a nearly$347 billion trade deficit with China and $64 
billion trade deficit with Mexico. See Trade in Goods with China, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/foreign- trade/balance/c5700.html#2016 [https://perma.cc/4RYJ-
W8H9]; Trade in Goods with Mexico, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/forei
gn-trade/balance/c2010.html#2016 [https://perma.cc/F94P-J97F].
5 See Matt O’Brien, Donald Trump’s Plan to Bring Jobs Back to America Comes with 
One Giant Asterisk, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/wonk/wp/2017/01/30/donald-trumps-big-plan-to-bring-jobs-back-to-america-has-one-
giant-astericks/?utm_term=.573d954af1df [https://perma.cc/U3WA-S7AB].
6 See Robert E. Scott et al., Reducing U.S. Trade Deficits Will Generate a 
Manufacturing-Based Recovery for the United States and Ohio, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Feb. 7, 
2013), http://www.epi.org/publication/bp351-trade-deficit-currency-manipulation/ [https://
perma.cc/Q8UN-5P8K].
7 See Heather Long, Rust Belt Voters Made Trump President. Now They Want Jobs,
CNN MONEY (Mar. 3, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/03/news/economy/donald-
trump-manufacturing-jobs/index.html [https://perma.cc/R4W6-7WJ5].
8 See id.
9 See infra Part III. 
10 According to Pew Research, 67%of Trump supporters had a negative view of free 
trade. Bruce Stokes, Republicans, Especially Trump Supporters, See Free Trade Deals as 
Bad for U.S., PEW (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/31/
republicans-especially-trump-supporters-see-free-trade-deals-as-bad-for-u-s/ [https://perm
a.cc/YA84-SLJV].
2018] INTERNATIONAL TRADE SANCTIONS 653
tariffs and other trade sanctions are too crude to achieve his promised results.
As set forth below, the effect on particular states of higher tariffs and other
commonly used trade sanctions such as anti-dumping duties, countervailing
duties, quotas, and trade embargoes cannot be predicted with any certainty.11
Trump’s trade policies may benefit some states while hurting others, and it is
not possible to predict which states will fall into which category.12 It is also
possible that some states will be worse off under Trump’s trade policies. To
further complicate matters, the states themselves are largely powerless to alter 
the effects of Trump’s trade policies.13 Under current U.S. constitutional law
and jurisprudence, the federal government today exercises the bulk of power
over international trade.14 Given Trump’s commitment to using trade sanctions,
what is needed is a federal-state consultation mechanism through which the
states can communicate directly to the federal government how trade policies are
affecting their interests.15 For example, if federal trade policy is actually leading
to further loss of jobs, the states should be able to communicate this directly to
the federal government so it can adjust the policy. There is no indication,
however, that the current Administration is interested in using such a process.16
The current Administration appears intent on moving forward with its trade
policies with little input from the states even though some states could suffer
serious harm from the implementation of these policies.17
This Article will demonstrate why trade sanctions are blunt instruments that
have unpredictable effects on the states.18 Although many economists question
the usefulness of trade sanctions, many politicians find them to be useful
political tools because they have historically enjoyed popular support.19 If the
current Administration is intent on using them to achieve domestic policy
objectives, then using such blunt instruments could be more effective if the
                                                                                                                     
11 These trade sanctions are further discussed and defined in notes 30–43. The 
arguments why Trump’s trade policies will lead to unpredictable results are set forth in Part 
III infra.
12 See infra Part III.
13 See infra Part IV.
14 See infra Part IV.
15 See infra Part V.
16 See infra Part V.
17 See Jeff Daniels, Trump’s Trade and Immigration Policies Could Trip up 
California’s Growing Economy, CNBC (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/16
/trumps-trade-policies-could-hurt-californias-economy-say-economists.html [https://perma.
cc/NL6E-GYJW]; Heather Long & Andrew Van Dam, In a U.S.-China Trade War, Trump 
Voters Likely Get Hurt the Most, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/wonk/wp/2018/03/22/in-a-u-s-china-trade-war-trump-voters-likely-get-hurt-the-
most/?utm_term=.95e080f3cf79 [https://perma.cc/PR6V-CSG3] (discussing how states who 
export pork and soybeans could feel retaliatory effects of Trump’s trade policy). 
18 See infra Part III.
19 See infra Part V.
654 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 79:4
current Administration were willing to work together with the states to adjust
these policies as their effects on the states become evident.20
II. TRADE SANCTIONS AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
The current Administration has promised to impose tariffs on imports to
punish countries that trade unfairly with the United States.21 A tariff is a tax or 
duty imposed and collected on an import at a customs port of entry before the
import is allowed to enter the internal market of the importing country.22 In the
United States, the U.S. Customs Service, part of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, imposes and collects the tariff.23 All World Trade 
Organization (WTO) countries impose tariffs on imports.24 Tariffs serve different
purposes, but one common policy objective is to protect vulnerable domestic
industries from import competition.25 The tariff increases the price of the import
vis-à-vis the domestic product, which thereby gains a competitive advantage.26
The United States imposes its tariffs under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule
of the United States27 in accordance with its obligations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),28 a major discipline of the World
Trade Organization.29 U.S. tariffs are “bound” under GATT Article II:1(a) and
                                                                                                                     
20 See infra Part V.
21 See Margolis, supra note 3.
22 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 200 (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter CHOW & SCHOENBAUM,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW].
23 See JEFFREY F. BEATTY & SUSAN S. SAMUELSON, ESSENTIALS OF BUSINESS LAW 186
(3d ed. 2008).
24 See, e.g., WORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TARIFF PROFILES 2017 3 (2017), 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_profiles17_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3
X9-KM2Y] (detailing tariff parameters for the 164 WTO member-countries); THE WORLD 
BANK, Tariff Rate, Most Favored Nation, Weighted Mean, All Products (%), https://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/TM.TAX.MRCH.WM.FN.ZS (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) [https://
perma.cc/B7YV-PGCB] (providing tariff rates for 264 trading economies).
25 See Simon Lester, The Role of the International Trade Regime in Global 
Governance, 16 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 209, 253 (2011).
26 See David John Marotta, Do Tariffs Protect an Infant Industry?, FORBES (May 5, 
2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidmarotta/2013/05/05/do-tariffs-protect-an-infant-
industry/#74aed61d6371 [https://perma.cc/TA3M-2M23].
27 See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, OFFICIAL HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE 2018,
https://www.usitc.gov/tata/hts/index.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2018), [https://perma.cc/E2
BR-E2T2].
28 See Katherine Gustafson, Note, Boosting the Private Space Industry: Extending 
NASA’s Duty-Free Import Exemption to Commercial Space Companies, 6 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L. REV. 325, 334 (2015).
29 During the first half of the twentieth century, nations were free to impose tariffs 
without any constraints. Left to their own devices, nations erected trade barriers through high 
tariffs and viewed each other with suspicion and deep mistrust. By the 1930s, trade tensions 
erupted that ultimately contributed to the Second World War. It became clear to the United 
States that discipline had to be injected into the process of setting tariffs or else conflicts 
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II:1(b),30 that is, subject to a legal ceiling above which the tariff cannot be
lawfully imposed.31 All U.S. tariffs, along with all other WTO countries’ tariffs,
are set forth in the U.S. GATT Schedule, reached after lengthy mutual
negotiations with all other WTO members, and annexed to the GATT.32 Just as
the United States cannot exceed its GATT commitments and impose higher
tariffs on imports from other WTO members, no WTO member can impose
tariffs on U.S. imports higher than its commitments under its GATT Schedule.33
A second important GATT obligation is the prohibition against quotas or
quantitative restrictions.34 GATT Article XI:1 prohibits the United States from
imposing quotas on imports from other WTO members.35 For example, under
Article XI:1, the United States cannot limit the amount of imported steel from
                                                                                                                     
would arise again. To instill a much-needed discipline into international trade, the United 
States led a group of nations at a conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire that led to 
the establishing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947), the first multilateral 
trade treaty designed to reduce tariffs. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was a 
resounding success and is now known as the GATT (1994) and part of the WTO formally 
established in 1995. The GATT is responsible for historically low tariffs on most products 
in the world. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 22, at 
18–19, 26.
30 GATT Articles II:1(a) and II:1(b) provided in relevant part:
Article II
Schedules of Concessions
(a) Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting parties 
treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the 
appropriate schedule annexed to this Agreement.
(b) The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting party, 
which are the products of territories of other contracting parties, shall, on their 
importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates . . . be exempt from ordinary 
customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided therein . . . .
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. II:1(a)–(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 
200 [hereinafter GATT].
31 See id.
32 See id. at 204.
33 See id. at 200.
34 See id. art. XI at 224, 226.
35 GATT Article XI states in relevant part:
Article XI
General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made 
effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted 
or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory 
of any other contracting party . . . .
See id. art. XI:1 at 224, 226.
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Brazil or China or ban the import of steel entirely.36 A trade ban or embargo is
a quantitative restriction of zero and is unlawful under Article XI:1.37
Although GATT Article II:1(b) binds tariffs and Article XI:1 creates a “no 
quotas” rule, the GATT also contains exceptions that permits both measures if
certain criteria are met.38 GATT Article XX is a general exceptions provision
that permits trade sanctions in the event of certain special trade situations.39 For
example, Article XX(b) permits trade sanctions when “necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health.”40 If the United States found that a certain
food product was unsafe for human consumption, the United States could
impose a total trade ban (i.e., an embargo) on all imports of the product under
Article XX(b).41 Article XX contains a total of twelve exceptions.42
Article XIX creates an additional exception for emergency action on imports.43
This is the so-called “safeguards” provision that allows a country to impose
trade sanctions to deal with a putative trade emergency caused by a sudden and
unexpected increase in imports flooding the domestic market and harming
domestic industries.44 A nation is allowed to impose higher tariffs or quotas as
a “safeguard” on a temporary basis.45
In addition, several other GATT provisions and related WTO agreements
allow a nation to unilaterally impose trade sanctions to deal with unfair trade
practices by the exporting nation.46 If a country is “dumping” its products in the 
United States, the WTO permits the United States to impose an anti-dumping
duty, which is an additional tariff above the normal GATT rate.47 Dumping
                                                                                                                     
36 Id.
37 See GATT, supra note 30, art. XI at 224.
38 Id. at art. II:1(b) at 200 and art. XI:1–2 at 224, 226.
39 See id. art. XX at 262.
40 See id. art. XX(b) at 262.
41 See id. art. XX at 262.
42 See id. art. XX at 262, 264. The original safeguards provision in the GATT has been 
amplified by the WTO Agreement on Safeguards (1994). Most questions related to 
safeguards are now resolved in accordance with the WTO Safeguards Agreement, not GATT 
XIX. The United States has implemented the relevant provisions of the WTO Safeguards 
Act in Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. 12, §§ 2151–55 
(2017).
43 See GATT, supra note 30, art. XIX at 260.
44 See id.
45 See id. art. XII:1 at 228.
46 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 22, at 467. The 
nation that is the object of the trade sanctions can challenge the sanctions in the WTO as 
unjustified. Id. If the complaining nation wins, the WTO asks the offending nation to remove 
the offending trade measures. See id. at 84.
47 See GATT, supra note 30, art. VI at 212. The original anti-dumping provision in the 
GATT has been amplified by the WTO Antidumping Agreement on Implementation of 
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994). Most questions related to 
dumping and anti-dumping duties are now resolved in accordance with the WTO Anti-
dumping Agreement, not GATT Article XVI. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW, supra note 22, at 467. The United States has implemented the relevant 
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occurs when a country sells a product in the United States (or any target market)
at artificially low prices (i.e., below cost) in order to obtain a market niche.48
Once the niche is obtained, the exporter can raise its price or lower the quality
of its product, causing harm to the domestic market.49 An anti-dumping duty
that equals the margin of dumping is imposed to offset the low price.50 The
margin of dumping is the difference between the low price currently charged
for the export and a fair market value for the import.51 A second unfair trade
practice is subsidization.52 If the government of an exporting country gives a
subsidy, i.e., a makes a financial contribution, to an exporter, the exporter can
then charge a lower price for the export.53 The lower priced export becomes
more competitive in the target market but causes harm to local competitors
because the competitive advantage is due to government intervention not market
efficiency.54 To offset the harmful effects of the subsidy, the importing country
imposes an additional tariff above the GATT rate called a countervailing duty.55
The additional tariff countervails the subsidy by neutralizing its effects.56
The United States has been a frequent user of safeguards, anti-dumping, and
countervailing duties on imports.57 President Trump’s bold announcements of
his trade policies signal to the rest of the world that the United States might be
even more aggressive in using these trade sanctions to counter what Trump
believes are unfair trade practices targeting the United States and trade
agreements that harm U.S. interests.58
                                                                                                                     
provisions of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement as part. of the Tariff Act of 1930. 19 U.S.C. 
4, §§ 1673–1673i (1994).
48 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 22, at 467.
49 See id. at 469.
50 See id. at 467.
51 See id.
52 See GATT, supra note 30, art. XVI at 250. The original subsidies provision in the 
GATT has been amplified by the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (1994). Most questions related to subsidies are now resolved in accordance with 
the WTO Subsidies Agreement, not GATT Article XVI. See WORLD TRADE ORG.,
Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/agrm8_e.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2018). The United States has implemented the 
relevant provisions of the WTO Subsidies Agreement as part of the Tariff Act of 1930. 19 
U.S.C. 4, §§ 1673–1673i (1994).
53 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 22, at 518–19.
54 See id. at 519.
55 See id. at 517.
56 See id.
57 See Don Lee, Limited Success of Chinese Tire Tariffs Show Why Donald Trump’s
Trade Prescription May Not Work, L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/busi
ness/la-fi-tariffs-trade-analysis-20160724-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/6HFW-5YRH].
58 See Frances Coppola, President Trump’s Trade Tariffs Signal a New Global Trade 
War, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2018/03/11/
president-trumps-trade-tariffs-signal-a-new-global-trade-war/#5581f68552f6 [https://perma
.cc/PF93-N9SP].
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III. EFFECTS OF TRADE SANCTIONS ON THE STATES
The effect of President Trump’s threatened trade sanctions against U.S. 
trading partners on the states is unpredictable. As further discussed below,
tariffs are a blunt instrument where some states may benefit while other states
may receive no benefits or even suffer serious harm.59 As a measure to help the
states that suffer harms from international trade, sanctions are an unwise choice.
Harm to states can occur under at least three different scenarios.
A. Retaliatory Trade Response to Tariffs
If the current Administration imposes higher tariffs on imports from a
trading partner as a sanction for unfair trade practices (such as dumping or
subsidization), the trading partner might retaliate with an increase of tariffs on
U.S. imports. In a recent case, the United States imposed higher tariffs on
imported tires from China as a safeguard.60 China responded with a tit-for-tat
increase in tariffs on chicken parts imported from the United States.61 While
the increased tariff on tires created a benefit for the U.S. tire industry, the
increased tariff on chicken parts harmed the farmers in states that depend on
agricultural exports.62
This case represents the unpredictable nature of tariff sanctions and the
possibility of a trade war that can result. When the United States imposes trade
sanctions on a powerful trading nation such as China, it is quite possible that the
trading partner will respond in kind.63 In the case of China, for example, China’s
leaders feel political pressure to respond in kind and not simply suffer the
sanctions in meek silence.64 Such a response would not be politically acceptable 
in China today as it could be seen as capitulation to bullying by the United
States.65 The tit-for-tat response means that when the Trump Administration
uses trade sanctions, the response could be to increase tariffs on U.S. imports,
which will cause harm to the U.S. industries and the states in which they are
located. The response chosen by China was to impose increased tariffs on
imported chicken parts, but China could have picked any number of other
                                                                                                                     
59 See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
60 Thomas J. Prusa & Edwin Vermulst, China-Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty 
Measures on Broiler Products from the United States: How the Chickens Came Home to 
Roost, 14 WORLD TRADE REV. 287, 332 (2015).
61 Id. at 332–33.
62 See id. at 333, 335.
63 See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, China Moves to Retaliate Against U.S. Tire Tariff, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 13, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/business/global/14trade.html 
[on file with Ohio State Law Journal]; Prusa & Vermulst, supra note 60, at 332–33.
64 See Wang Cong, China Will Resist if US Starts Trade War: Experts, GLOBAL TIMES
(Aug. 3, 2017), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1059575.shtml [https://perma.cc/SVH9-
FT9K].
65 See id.
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imports to target.66 China’s response is not limited to imposing higher tariffs on
imports of U.S. tires into China.67 Rather, China could have chosen to impose
higher tariffs on any U.S. imports.68 China can be quite strategic in choosing to
impose new tariffs in an area that will inflict the most pain on the United
States.69 Since it is not possible to predict with certainty the target of the trading
partner’s retaliatory measures, the United States cannot know ahead of time
which states will suffer harm as a result of the United States’ use of trade
sanctions against its trading partners.
Trade sanctions imposed by the United States on a powerful trading country
like China that refuses to acquiesce can easily escalate into a trade war. If the
pattern of U.S. trade sanctions being met with retaliatory measures is repeated
across different products and industries, the United States could find itself in a
full-scale trade war with its trading partners that could spill over into a global
trade crisis. If the United States and China do not trade with each other because
of high tariffs, then products from each country will be immediately diverted to
other markets. Other countries might then raise their tariffs to avoid having their
domestic markets flooded with products from the United States and China. The
erection of trade barriers by many countries could lead to a slowdown and
bottleneck in global trade and trigger a global economic crisis. Such a trade war
could harm the United States, its trading partner, and the world economy.
B. Increased Tariffs on Imports Could Harm U.S. Exports
Many products today are part of a global manufacturing chain.70 A product
can be made from raw materials accessed in one nation, processed in another,
                                                                                                                     
66 China did not frame the increased tariffs on chicken parts as a response to the U.S. 
tariffs on tires. Rather, China treated the chicken parts as a separate and independent trade 
case that had nothing to do with the tires. Of course, in reality, China imposed the tariffs to 
send the clear message to the United States that any new U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports will 
be met with new Chinese tariffs on U.S. imports. See Bradsher, supra note 63.
67 See Prusa & Vermulst, supra note 60, at 334; see also Minghao Li et al., Lessons 
from Previous U.S.-China Trade Disputes, AGRIC. POL’Y REV. 1–3 (2018).
68 See Prusa & Vermulst, supra note 60, at 334; see also Li, supra note 67, at 1
(explaining how China responds to U.S. tariffs with list of 128 U.S. products that are targets 
of retaliatory tariffs).
69 Agricultural exports are a sensitive area as they are very important to many states. 
China is the largest export market for U.S. agriculture with 2017 reaching seventeen percent 
of U.S. total agricultural products with a state such as Minnesota exporting 1.5 billion 
annually. Su Ye, China: Top Market for U.S. Ag Exports, MINN. DEPT. AGRIC. (2018), 
https://mda.state.mn.us/sites/default/files/inline-files/profilechina.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VR4M-WDR3].
70 Rising trade in intermediate input content (traded goods that are consumed as part of 
a manufacturing process) represents more than half of goods imported by OECD economies. 
PETER DRAPER ET AL., THE SHIFTING GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND TRADE POLICY 4 (World Economic Forum 2012), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GAC_GlobalTradeSystem_Report_2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DCE6-7FSY].
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and finished in a third nation.71 Industries in the United States are part of this
global chain.72 Many products in the United States are made using some
imported materials.73 Raising tariffs on imports can affect those industries in
the United States that make products for export using imported materials.
Suppose, for example, that a manufacturing plant in the mid-western United
States makes industrial equipment for export to countries in Europe and Asia.
The U.S. manufacturing plant uses steel imported from Brazil to manufacture
the equipment. In response to perceived unfair trade practices, the United States
imposes new tariffs on imported steel from Brazil. The cost of the new tariff is
passed on to the manufacturing plant by the importer who raises the U.S. sales
price of the steel. As the U.S. manufacturing plant pays more for the steel, the
manufacturing plant must raise the price of its exports to all countries. Raising
the price of its exports may result in lower sales to its overseas customers who
can obtain similar equipment from European competitors at lower prices
because their countries did not impose an extra tariff on steel imports from
Brazil. A related scenario is that when Brazil finds that the United States has
raised tariffs on its steel, Brazil may divert its steel to other markets that have
not raised their tariffs. Local producers of steel in the United States might then
raise their prices because of the short supply of steel.74 Local manufacturers
might be harmed because they might not be able to obtain enough steel to make
their products or might have to pay much higher prices to buy U.S.-made steel
due to the short supply. This is only one example of how an integrated global
manufacturing chain can result in a country creating a self-inflicted harm when
it imposes new tariffs on imports. The same pattern can be seen in many
different products across many different industries.
The additional tariffs imposed on the imports could have the ultimate effect
of harming exporting industries located in the United States.75 If the U.S. export
industries lose sales, then the industries might have to lower wages or lay off
workers. These are the exact types of harms that the trade sanctions are supposed
to remedy, not create. The complexities of global manufacturing make it
difficult to predict all of the consequences that flow from imposing a tariff on
imports.
                                                                                                                     
71 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
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74 The tariff has the effect of a subsidy given to domestic producers. Both efficient and 
inefficient domestic producers of the competing domestic good will raise their prices in 
response to a tariff on imports. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra 
note 22, at 201.
75 See Prusa & Vermulst, supra note 60, at 333, 335.
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C. Repatriation of Jobs and Job Losses
The Trump Administration claims that its trade policies will result in the
repatriation back to the United States of jobs outsourced or relocated to foreign
countries.76 U.S. companies have moved some of their operations overseas in
order to take advantage of lower manufacturing costs created by lax labor and
environmental conditions.77 Some of these companies find that costs are so low
overseas that it is more efficient to manufacture their products overseas and
export them back to the United States.78 The imposition of additional tariffs on
imported products manufactured by U.S. companies overseas will neutralize the
cost advantages of low cost overseas manufacturing creating a disincentive to
locate operations overseas.79 While some companies have moved their
operations back to the United States, their reasons are complex and seem to have
little to do with sanctions.80
Imposing trade sanctions seems to be an ineffective way to encourage U.S.
companies to repatriate jobs back to the United States. If U.S. companies find
that the costs of manufacturing in China, for example, have now been offset by
increased tariffs, these companies could relocate their operations to countries
that are even more low cost, such as Vietnam, and then from Vietnam to another
location. In fact, this relocation from China has been underway for a number of
years.81 As an alternative to relocating jobs back to the United States, U.S.
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79 See, e.g., Patrick Gillespie, ‘Those Jobs Are Gone and They’re Not Coming Back,’
CNN MONEY (Nov. 11, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/11/news/economy/trump-
trade-jobs-mexico-china/index.html [https://perma.cc/7AE8-BHFS] (showing how Trump 
threatens to use tariffs with the argument that companies will bring jobs back if it is too 
expensive to do business overseas).
80 See, e.g., Michael B. Sauter & Samuel Stebbins, Manufactures Bringing the Most 
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Manufacturing Powerhouse, WASH. POST (May 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
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companies might hire firms to lobby Congress to change trade policies82 or seek
to install a different administration in the White House in the next election
cycle.83 Even if U.S. companies were to repatriate jobs to the United States,
there is no guarantee that they will reopen shuttered factories in the original
location where the jobs were lost. U.S. companies that closed operations in
Indiana that decide to repatriate jobs might open a new factory in Alabama
instead.84 Only a far more sophisticated and coordinated plan involving state
input can funnel jobs to the states where they were lost. Tariff sanctions alone
cannot achieve this result.
The Trump Administration’s imposition of trade sanctions on imports might 
have the opposite effect of causing job losses in the United States.85 To the
extent that U.S. trading partners retaliate against the United States by imposing 
sanctions of their own on U.S. imports, certain U.S. export industries might be
harmed.86 As a cost cutting measure, these industries might have to lower wages
or eliminate jobs.87 U.S. export industries that import raw materials might
experience similar types of losses due to higher tariffs on their imported
materials, also leading to the elimination of jobs. The complexity of modern
manufacturing chains makes it difficult to predict where all the harmful effects
of tariffs on imports will ultimately fall.
                                                                                                                     
82 See Alice J.-H. Wohn, Comment, Towards GATT Interrogation: Circumventing 
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[https://perma.cc/4NTC-RM2A] (projected loss of up to four million jobs).
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87 For example, U.S. sanctions on Iran resulted in lost potential export revenue of 
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IV. THE STATES’ LIMITED POWER OVER INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
The ability of states to affect federal trade policies depends mainly on the
willingness of the federal government to accept state input. The states are largely
powerless to affect change on federal trade laws any other way. The states are
subject to significant legal constraints on how they can affect federal trade laws
on their own.88 These limitations on the power of the states are due to
constitutional constraints created both by the text of the Constitution and
Supreme Court jurisprudence.89
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to 
“regulate commerce with foreign states.”90 Thus, Congress has the final say on
legislation affecting U.S. trade law and policy. Over the years, Congress has
delegated significant legislative authority over international trade to the
President of the United States.91 In addition, the President has other
constitutional sources of power over international trade. Article II of the U.S.
Constitution vests the President with particular responsibilities over foreign
affairs and the power to negotiate and make international agreements.92 The
President also has inherent power over international trade created by the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.93
Under the federal system, the states are free in theory to act in areas of
international trade that have not been affected by the exercise of federal
power.94 If President Trump were to impose trade sanctions that adversely affect
the states, however, the states would be significantly limited in their ability to
circumvent the harmful effects of those sanctions.
The Supreme Court explained these constraints in Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council.95 In that case, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
passed a law that barred state entities from buying goods and services from a
list of any persons or entities doing business with Burma.96 Subsequently,
Congress enacted a statute imposing a set of mandatory and conditional trade
sanctions on Burma.97 The Supreme Court held that the Massachusetts law was
                                                                                                                     
88 See Amol Mehra, Note, Federalism and International Trade: The Intersection of the 
World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Act and State “Buy Local”
Legislation, 4 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 179, 192–96 (2008).
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92 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
93 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–36 (1952) 
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96 Id. at 366–67.
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void because it was in conflict with the federal statute.98 The Court held that
Congress had preempted the field.99 Preemption can occur when (1) Congress
intends federal law “to occupy the field”100 or (2) when the state law stands as 
“an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.”101 The Massachusetts state law was an obstacle
because it created a set of mandatory and inflexible trade sanctions whereas the
federal scheme gave the President flexibility in being able to withdraw
sanctions to reward Burma when he certified that Burma had made progress on
human rights.102 The state scheme had no mechanism to remove sanctions as a
reward for progress.103 The Supreme Court found the inflexibility of the state
scheme to be an obstacle to the achievement of the federal goal of pressuring
Burma to improve its human rights record.104
Crosby and other facets of U.S. constitutional law indicate that in matters of
international trade, the states are powerless to evade or vary the effects of trade
sanctions. Suppose, for example, that a foreign nation retaliates against higher
U.S. tariffs on its imports by imposing a higher tariff on U.S. agricultural
imports. A state that depends on agricultural exports might be
disproportionately affected by the tariff but the state cannot evade the tariff by
entering into negotiations directly with the foreign nation to reduce the tariffs.
Federal law has preempted the field.105 Or suppose that the United States
imposes a punitive tariff on imports from a foreign nation that a state needs as
raw materials to manufacture products for exports. The state cannot reimburse
the foreign nation for the amount of the higher tariff to encourage imports as
this would create an obstacle to the achievement of the federal statute’s goal of 
punishing the foreign trading nation for unfair trade practices.106 In these cases,
the way forward for the states is to work with the federal government to adjust
trade policies that harm their interests. A state can ask the federal government
to negotiate with the foreign nation to reduce its tariffs on agricultural imports
or to impose a tariff-rate quota107 instead of a plain tariff on imports of raw
materials that it needs to manufacture exports.
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Since the present Administration has shown a firm commitment to using
trade sanctions, it should complement the use of trade sanctions by creating a
federal-state consultative procedure dealing specifically with the effects of trade
sanctions on the states. Such a procedure will allow the states to have input on
federal trade policies that directly affect their interests. In fact, a similar federal-
state consultative procedure was created in the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act (1994),108 the legislation that implemented the WTO agreements into U.S
domestic law. Under the URAA, the states were allowed to directly raise issues
with the federal government on the effect of the implementation of the WTO
agreements on the states.109 A similar consultation process should be created by
the Trump Administration in conjunction with any program of trade sanctions
that it intends to impose. This Article has argued that the need for such a
consultation procedure is clear. The impact of trade sanctions on the states is
unpredictable and can result in more harm than good for some states. Since the
states are mainly powerless to evade the effects of federal trade policies under
the U.S. constitutional scheme, the states can affect trade only by working
through the federal government. Such a federal-state consultation procedure
will allow the states to make their interests known and avoid or mitigate the
harms to the states that can be the indirect consequences of imposing trade
sanctions on other countries. At present, the current administration has shown
no indication that it intends to create such a mechanism or any other means to
consult with the states.
V. CONCLUSION
The Trump Administration has announced its intentions to use trade
sanctions where necessary to achieve political goals. This Article has argued
that trade sanctions are a poor vehicle to implement domestic policies. Tariffs
are a crude and cumbersome instrument and their effects on the states are
unpredictable. For decades, economists have argued against using tariffs
because they create more harm to the nation imposing them than benefits.110
Yet, nations continue to use tariffs and other trade sanctions because they serve
important political purposes—trade sanctions are popular among industries
harmed by imports and create political support even though trade sanctions are
a self-inflicted harm overall.111 In the case of President Trump’s proposed trade 
sanctions, they can inflict unpredictable harms on the states.
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One way to address these potential harms is to create a federal-state
consultative process on the effects of trade sanctions. The states need such a
procedure because constitutional constraints prevent them from effectively
avoiding the harmful effects of federal trade policies through their own actions.
There is precedent for such a procedure as a similar procedure was created for
the implementation of the WTO agreements into federal and state law.112 At
present, the Trump Administration has not indicated any interest in establishing
such a procedure.113 Some type of catalyst, either in the form of calls by the
states or in the form of calls within the Trump administration, seems needed to
create such a procedure. The need for such a procedure is pressing since trade
sanctions are too blunt an instrument to effectively achieve domestic policies
and can create unintended harms to the states.
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